Google AdSense: Advocate General Kokott proposes setting aside General Court ruling

13 novembro 2026

In brief

On 12 November 2026, Advocate General Juliane Kokott delivered her Opinion in Case C-826/24 P, Commission v Google and Alphabet (Google AdSense).
She proposes that the General Court's judgment of 18 September 2024, which annulled the fine of almost €1.5 billion, be set aside and the case referred back.
The Opinion is not binding on the Court of Justice, which will rule at a later date.

Advocate General Juliane Kokott has proposed that the Court of Justice of the European Union set aside the judgment that annulled a fine of almost €1.5 billion imposed on Google over its AdSense contracts. Her Opinion in Case C-826/24 P, delivered on 12 November 2026, bears on how exclusionary effects are proved under Article 102 TFEU.

What is at stake

AdSense for Search allowed websites with an integrated search engine to display Google search ads and share in the revenue. Operators negotiated a “Google Services Agreement”. From March 2009, the model templates contained clauses restricting or prohibiting the display of competing ads: an exclusivity clause, a placement clause and a prior authorisation clause.

In March 2019, the European Commission found that, between 2006 and 2016, these clauses amounted to a single and continuous infringement of Article 102 TFEU, and fined Google, partly jointly and severally with Alphabet. The General Court annulled the decision by judgment of 18 September 2024 (T-334/19), citing an inadequate examination of the circumstances, in particular the duration of the contractual relationship. The Commission appealed.

The Advocate General’s reasoning

Kokott recalls the criteria set out in Intel (C-413/14 P) for assessing exclusionary effects stemming from the contractual commitments of a dominant undertaking, including duration. In her view, the General Court demanded an overly detailed analysis of each criterion in isolation, so that a shortcoming on one could by itself lead to annulment. She considers that the criteria should be weighed together.

She also finds it mistaken to require an examination of each underlying contract. In principle it is enough to consider cumulatively the contracts significant to competition on the market and their durations, and to show that, given their content and application, they were capable of producing such effects collectively. She considers the Commission did so, including by relying on average values. Having erred on effects, the General Court also erred in denying a single and continuous infringement.

Next steps

She proposes referring the case back to the General Court, which has yet to address some of Google’s pleas, including its objections to the amount of the fine. In any event, the fine should be reduced: the Commission did not challenge the findings concerning 2016, which are final. The Opinion is not binding, and the judges are now beginning their deliberations.

Our view at CEA Digital Law

If the Court of Justice follows this line, it would reinforce a useful point of legal certainty: in contractual abuse cases, the burden of proof is met by a coherent overall assessment, not by a pile of partial analyses. This matters for digital advertising and for other markets where standard-form contracts are applied at scale. It is also relevant for competition authorities in Latin America and the Caribbean and in Africa, which often draw on European case law while working with limited resources.

A balance is nonetheless needed: a flexible evidential standard calls for clear reasoning that allows effective judicial review and protects the rights of defence. Two questions remain open: how the Court of Justice will weigh duration against the other criteria, and how the fine will be recalculated after the fresh review. We will follow the judgment closely.