The judgment of the Judicial Court of Marseille that has surprised us was issued on March 20, 2025 and corresponds to the case AZ Factory against Valeria Moda.
In this litigation, AZ Factory accused the French company Valeria Moda of infringing copyright by marketing garments that reproduced the original characteristics of its designs “Love from Alber” and “Hearts from Alber”
The court recognized the evidentiary validity of the blockchain records filed by AZ Factory, establishing that the ownership of the copyright in the aforementioned garments was demonstrated by the blockchain date records of May 5, 2021 and September 15, 2021.
As a result, Valeria Moda was convicted of copyright infringement and ordered to pay damages to AZ Factory to compensate for the harm suffered.
1. Introduction
The legal recognition of technological evidence has undergone a constant evolution over the last decades. However, the recent judgment of the Tribunal Judiciaire de Marseille of March 20, 2025 marks a turning point that forces us to rethink the foundations on which the evidentiary statute in intellectual property matters is based.
In this case, which pitted the firm AZ Factory against the French company Valeria Moda, the court addressed the issue of copyright infringement on designs registered on blockchain. What was relevant was not only the admission of the hash as proof of anteriority, but that it attributed ownership of the copyright exclusively by virtue of registration on the blockchain. There was no prior official registration or additional contractual documentation. Only technological evidence, apparently objective, automatic and external to any public entity.
At first glance, the judgment can be interpreted as a gesture of legal modernization: a courageous opening towards the recognition of new forms of digital documentation. But beneath this appearance of progress lies a major structural tension. Because if a court can confer subjective rights with full legal effects based on a mere blockchain hash – without institutional contrast, without expert opinion on their legitimacy, without prior public registration – what is at stake is not only the acceptance of new evidentiary technologies, but the displacement of the very system of guarantees that sustains legal certainty in the attribution of rights.
Are we, therefore, facing a simple evidentiary evolution or a doctrinal rupture with unforeseeable consequences?
Is blockchain a qualified and sufficient proof to establish the existence and ownership of intellectual rights?
Or are we giving in to technological fascination without rigorously examining the legal implications that this entails?
This structural legal analysis aims to address these issues from a critical perspective, analysing the real value that can – and cannot – be placed on blockchain-based evidence in the context of copyright and, in particular, in its confrontation with the classic registration principles that guarantee opposability, traceability and legal certainty.
2. Technical and Legal Foundations of Blockchain-Based Evidence
In the evidentiary field, one of the essential functions of digital technology is the certification of the temporal moment of creation or existence of content, known as timestamping. This mechanism allows a certain date to be set precisely, generally with a guarantee of integrity, on a given document, file or creative expression. The use of blockchain in this context has been received by many as a disruptive innovation, capable of replacing or at least competing with classic electronic certification systems. But what is really behind this alleged superiority?
2.1. The hash as an evidentiary anchor
The evidence presented in the French case consisted of a hash – a cryptographic fingerprint generated from a digital file – registered on a public blockchain, with a verifiable time stamp. The fundamental property of hashing is that it is a one-way function: any alteration of the original content generates a completely different footprint. This makes it possible to ensure that the corresponding file existed on a certain date and that it has not been modified since then.
However, the hash does not identify the author or the right holder, nor does it alone credit the creation process, nor does it establish a legally binding connection between the person who generates it and the protected content. It is, in short, a proof of existence and integrity, not of authorship or subjective rights. Therefore, its value as evidence attributing ownership is limited, unless it is accompanied by other evidence or a presumption in its favour is admitted.
2.2. What differentiates blockchain from other electronic certification systems?
There are numerous mechanisms in legal practice prior to the use of blockchain that allow the existence, date and integrity of digital documents to be proved:
Electronic trust service providers qualified under the eIDAS Regulation (such as Logalty, eGarante, Signaturit, among others).
Electronic notarial certifications.
RFC 3161 time stamps issued by recognized authorities.
Certified email, digital acknowledgment of receipt or reliable delivery platforms.
The most prominent difference between these systems and blockchain is that the former depend on a trusted third party, while blockchain operates on a decentralized system where, in theory, there is no single entity that can manipulate the record. This has led to the belief that blockchain offers a superior form of immutability, traceability, and fraud resistance. But this decentralization does not guarantee, by itself, the evidentiary reliability or legal validity of the data, especially if:
The blockchain is not auditable, verifiable or its code is not open.
The hash insertion process is not tied to a qualified electronic identity.
There is no chain of custody between the author and the registered content.
2.3. The eIDAS 2 Regulation and the status of electronic ledgers
Regulation (EU) 2022/0240, known as eIDAS 2, which is in an advanced stage of implementation, introduces for the first time a legal definition of the concept of electronic ledger (electronic ledger), explicitly including blockchain. The regulation establishes that:
“An electronic ledger shall not be denied legal effect or admissibility as evidence in judicial or administrative proceedings merely because it is in electronic form or does not meet the requirements to be considered qualified.”
However, only electronic ledgers managed by qualified providers may benefit from the presumption of completeness, accuracy and chronological order in accordance with Article 45g of the proposed text.
Therefore, under eIDAS 2:
Every electronic ledger is admissible as evidence, but
Only qualified persons enjoy a reinforced presumption (iuris tantum) as to their veracity.
This point is essential to understand why the Marseille judgment represents a doctrinal break: the court grants substantive effects to a blockchain hash without requiring a ledger qualification, or qualified identification of the author, or a direct legal connection with the content.
3. Critical analysis of the judgment: between evidentiary innovation and risk of legal destructuring
The judgment of the Tribunal Judiciaire de Marseille undoubtedly represents an unprecedented step in the recognition of blockchain as evidence in the field of intellectual property. But what is really new – and legally disturbing – is not that a hash registered on a blockchain has been accepted as valid evidence, but that such proof has been considered sufficient to attribute ownership of a copyright, without the existence of an official registration, contract, testimony or any additional evidence.
3.1. From proof of fact to attribution of law: a qualitative leap
Traditionally, the value of proof in copyright matters has been understood in terms of procedural evidence: it is a matter of proving that a content existed on a certain date and under certain conditions. But in this case, the court has gone a step further: it has considered that the technological test is sufficient to legally declare who is the owner of the subjective right over the design in dispute.
This represents a qualitative leap that is not without risks, because it turns a technical evidentiary instrument into a direct source of legal legitimacy, without institutional support or contrast with other security mechanisms.
3.2. The absence of registration as a breaking point
In most legal systems, registration in official registers does not constitute copyright, but it does act as a guarantee of publicity, traceability and opposability. Therefore, although ownership is born with creation, the most solid and universally recognized evidence is still the registration in national or international intellectual property registries.
The judicial decision in question breaks with this logic of the system, by declaring ownership on the basis of a private and unregulated technological test, opening the door to scenarios of legal uncertainty:
What would happen if someone else files a different, but older, hash on another blockchain?
What legitimacy does a non-auditable chain have, without institutional verification or guarantee of identity?
What if the file itself linked to the hash was plagiarized, and the hash is simply proof of possession, not authorship?
The court, by ignoring these issues, shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, reversing in practice the principle of presumption of innocence in the civil sphere.
3.3. Presumption of legitimacy without institutional control
One of the most controversial elements of the ruling is the implicit acceptance of a presumption of legitimacy stemming from the mere existence of hash on blockchain. The court seems to understand that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that technical evidence is sufficient to attribute the right, which means granting attributive value and not just circumstantial value to a tool that, by its very nature, does not verify identities or control legal intentions.
On a comparative level, this position departs from the prudent trend of other jurisdictions, which admit blockchain as a means of proof of facts, but not as an exclusive basis of legal attribution. In systems such as the German, Spanish or Canadian, the general rule remains that proof of authorship requires a set of convergent evidence, among which blockchain can play a relevant, but never exclusive, role.
3.4. A risky precedent in times of legal hyper-technologization
The main risk of this ruling does not lie in the use of blockchain, but in the principle it enshrines: that a private technology, without auditing or official qualification, can replace the traditional function of registration law or structured judicial evidence.
This generates a precedent that can be misinterpreted or instrumentalized by economic operators, technology platforms or individuals who, with access to blockchain tools, could present themselves as rights holders with no other support than a unilaterally generated hash.
4. The principle of legal certainty and its fragility in the face of technological disintermediation
The French judgment that recognizes attributive effects to evidence based exclusively on blockchain, without prior registration or institutional verification, raises a fundamental question that transcends the evidentiary: can legal certainty be maintained if the system of attribution of rights is fragmented into multiple private, unaudited technologies without public control?
The principle of legal certainty, enshrined in most modern constitutional texts (art. 9.3 of the Spanish Spanish Constitution, art. 1 of the French Civil Code, art. 1.1 of the Italian Constitution, among others), requires that legal rules and procedures be predictable, stable and accessible, so that citizens and economic operators can foresee the legal consequences of their actions.
This principle is not limited to the formal guarantee of legality, but also fulfils a structural function of balancing individual freedom, legitimate expectations and the normative order. In this sense, registration law – both in its public dimension and in its procedural aspect – has historically been one of the pillars of this stability, offering:
Advertising to third parties.
Presumption of legitimacy of the registered owner.
Legal traceability of rights.
And, in many cases, international coordination through interoperable treaties and registries.
By replacing this model with private registries – such as public or semi-private blockchains – managed outside any institutional system, there is a technological disintermediation of law that, if not regulated, weakens its own constitutional foundations. This fragmentation, although driven by innovation, risks generating:
Plurality of evidentiary truths, without clear hierarchical criteria.
Ownership conflicts not resolved ex ante, but only through litigation.
Uncertain opposability, especially in cross-border relationships or in environments without a qualified digital identity.
In addition, the principle of equal access to effective legal protection (Article 24 EC, Article 6 ECHR) could also be violated if the legal validity of evidence is subordinated to the economic or technical capacity to access a given blockchain solution, depriving other operators of equivalent but more accessible tools.
In this context, it cannot be ignored that the Law has a guarantee function that cannot be delegated to technological systems, no matter how efficient they may seem. The idea of replacing legal procedures, public registers or official certifications with decentralised technologies cannot be justified on grounds of efficiency or speed, if this undermines the common legal protection framework.
What is at stake is not only the value of evidence in a specific dispute, but the normative model on which the protection of rights in the digital age is built.
5. Proposal for an integrating framework: harmonization between evidentiary technology and institutional guarantees
If technological progress poses challenges for the law, the solution is not to ignore innovation, but to integrate it into a regulatory framework that preserves the structural principles of the legal system. The recognition of blockchain as a means of proof – and even as an attributive tool in some contexts – does not have to imply the erosion of legal certainty, as long as clear regulatory criteria, institutional interoperability and verifiable control mechanisms are established.
5.1. Blockchain as a complementary, not a substitute tool
The first step is to redefine the role of blockchain in the evidentiary ecosystem: not as a substitute for official records or as autonomous and self-sufficient proof of ownership, but as an additional element of technical evidence, useful to reinforce existing evidence or anticipate its conservation in future disputes.
In other words, blockchain should be understood as an instrument of documentary reinforcement, not as an original source of rights or as an exclusive presumption of authorship.
5.2. Qualified providers and audited registers: towards a European legal standard
The entry into force of the eIDAS 2 Regulation offers a strategic opportunity to establish a common standard in the legal use of distributed technologies. Specifically, the following could be promoted:
The creation of blockchains audited and certified by qualified trusted electronic service providers, subject to verification and interoperability within the European market.
The integration of qualified digital identity systems (eIDAS) that allow the hash to be linked to an officially recognised natural or legal person.
The registration of these acts in public or mixed meta-registries, with traceability and institutional integration.
This approach would ensure the reliability of the tests, without sacrificing technological efficiency or automated traceability of distributed systems.
5.3. Interconnection between blockchain and official records
A realistic and technologically viable legal path is the interconnection between blockchain and public registries, so that:
Registrations in blockchain can have reinforced probative value if they are validated by the registry system.
Public registries accept evidence generated on the blockchain as valid evidence, as long as it meets certain technical, identity, and integrity requirements.
An evidentiary chain of custody recognized by the judicial system is established, which allows the authenticity of the content and its link with the owner of the right to be accredited.
This formula would make it possible to take advantage of the efficiency of technology without renouncing the legal guarantees of registration law, configuring a hybrid and secure ecosystem.
5.4. A new framework for the digital evidentiary ecosystem
The solution is not to choose between the classic model and technology, but to build an intermediate model of evidentiary governance, based on:
Common standards of evidentiary digital interoperability.
Technological and institutional auditing.
Mutual recognition of verified digital evidence, at least at the European level.
This framework would make it possible to respond to the challenge posed by the Marseille ruling without falling into technological maximalism or legal anachronisms, and would turn the disruptive potential of blockchain into an opportunity to strengthen the digital rule of law.
6. Wrapping Up
The judgment of the Court Judiciaire de Marseille in March 2025 marks a before and after in the legal use of blockchain as a means of proof in intellectual property matters. Its pioneering nature lies not only in the recognition of the chronological value of a hash, but also in its decision to directly attribute ownership of a subjective right on the exclusive basis of that technological evidence, without prior registration or institutional verification.
This precedent, although innovative, questions the fundamental pillars of legal certainty, by shifting the probative value of the institutional system towards technological solutions that are not regulated or audited. Attributing rights based on private registers, without public control mechanisms or verifiable legal traceability, opens up a scenario of regulatory fragmentation and structural insecurity that the Law cannot ignore.
Blockchain technology offers real advantages: immutability, traceability, and efficiency. But its potential must be channeled legally, not elevated to an autonomous source of legitimacy. The current challenge is not technological, but normative: how to incorporate these tools into an evidentiary ecosystem that is guaranteed, interoperable and subject to the principle of legality.
Faced with the temptation to replace classical systems with decentralised solutions, the legal response must be inclusive. Technological innovation cannot weaken the institutional architecture of the rule of law, nor displace the registry system as an instrument of publicity, protection and legal certainty.
Therefore, it is essential to move towards a hybrid model, where blockchain can play a complementary role within a regulated framework, linked to qualified providers, with digital identity certification and institutional verification. Only in this way can it be guaranteed that the technological revolution does not erode the structural principles of the legal order, but rather reinforces them and projects them towards a fair, secure and coherent digital future.
