{"id":122945,"date":"2025-04-09T02:29:05","date_gmt":"2025-04-09T00:29:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ceadigilaw.org\/blog\/blockchain-et-propriete-intellectuelle-le-jugement-de-marseille-qui-a-tout\/"},"modified":"2025-04-09T02:29:05","modified_gmt":"2025-04-09T00:29:05","slug":"blockchain-et-propriete-intellectuelle-le-jugement-de-marseille-qui-a-tout","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ceadigilaw.org\/fr\/blog\/blockchain-et-propriete-intellectuelle-le-jugement-de-marseille-qui-a-tout\/","title":{"rendered":"Blockchain and intellectual property: the Marseille judgment that changed everything"},"content":{"rendered":"
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By Antonio Tejeda Encinas<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>, President of the Euro-American Committee of Digital Law - CEA Digital Law<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/em><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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<\/div>\n
\u2018An electronic ledger shall not be denied legal effect or admissibility as evidence in judicial or administrative proceedings solely on the grounds that it is in electronic form or that it does not meet the requirements to be considered qualified.\u2019<\/em><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

The judgment of the Marseille Judicial Court that has taken us by surprise was handed down on 20 March 2025 in the case of AZ Factory v Valeria Moda.<\/p>\n

In this dispute, AZ Factory accused the French company Valeria Moda of copyright infringement for marketing garments that reproduced the original features of its \u2018Love from Alber\u2019 and \u2018Hearts from Alber\u2019 designs.<\/p>\n

The court recognised the evidential value of the blockchain records submitted by AZ Factory, holding that ownership of the author\u2019s economic rights in those garments was established by the blockchain timestamps of 5 May 2021 and 15 September 2021.<\/p>\n

As a result, Valeria Moda was found liable for copyright infringement and ordered to pay AZ Factory damages to compensate for the harm suffered.<\/p>\n

1. Introduction<\/p>\n

The legal recognition of technological evidence has evolved steadily over recent decades. However, the recent judgment of the Tribunal Judiciaire de Marseille of 20 March 2025 marks a turning point that forces us to rethink the foundations on which the evidential framework for intellectual property rests.<\/p>\n

In this case, which pitted the AZ Factory label against the French company Valeria Moda, the court addressed the infringement of copyright in designs recorded on a blockchain. What matters is not only that the hash was admitted as proof of anteriority, but that the court attributed ownership of the copyright solely on the strength of the blockchain record. There was no prior official registration and no additional contractual documentation \u2013 only a piece of technological evidence, seemingly objective, automatic and independent of any public body.<\/p>\n

At first sight, the judgment may be read as a gesture of legal modernisation: a bold step towards recognising new forms of digital documentation. But beneath this appearance of progress lies a deep structural tension. If a court can confer individual rights with full legal effect on the basis of a mere blockchain hash \u2013 with no institutional cross-checking, no expert assessment of its legitimacy and no prior public registration \u2013 what is at stake is not only the acceptance of new evidential technologies but the displacement of the very system of safeguards that underpins legal certainty in the attribution of rights.<\/p>\n

Are we, then, looking at a simple evolution in the law of evidence, or at a doctrinal rupture with unforeseeable consequences?<\/p>\n

Is blockchain qualified and sufficient evidence on which to establish the existence and ownership of intellectual property rights?<\/p>\n

Or are we yielding to the allure of technology without examining its legal implications with due rigour?<\/p>\n

This structural legal analysis sets out to address these questions from a critical perspective, examining the real value that can \u2013 and cannot \u2013 be given to blockchain-based evidence in the context of copyright and, in particular, how it measures up against the classic registration principles that guarantee enforceability against third parties, traceability and legal certainty.<\/p>\n

2. Technical and legal foundations of blockchain-based evidence<\/p>\n

In the field of evidence, one of the essential functions of digital technology is to certify the moment at which content was created or existed, known as timestamping. This mechanism makes it possible to fix a precise and reliable date, usually with a guarantee of integrity, for a given document, file or creative expression. Many have hailed the use of blockchain in this context as a disruptive innovation, capable of replacing, or at least competing with, traditional electronic certification systems. But what really lies behind this supposed superiority?<\/p>\n

2.1. The hash as an evidential anchor<\/p>\n

The evidence submitted in the French case consisted of a hash \u2013 a cryptographic fingerprint generated from a digital file \u2013 recorded on a public blockchain with a verifiable timestamp. The defining property of a hash is that it is a one-way function: any alteration of the original content produces a completely different fingerprint. This makes it possible to confirm that the file in question existed on a given date and has not been modified since.<\/p>\n

However, a hash does not identify the author or the rightholder; nor does it, on its own, prove the creative process or establish a legally binding link between the person who generates it and the protected content. It is, in short, proof of existence and integrity, not of authorship or of individual rights. Its value as evidence of ownership is therefore limited, unless it is backed by other evidence or a presumption in its favour is accepted.<\/p>\n

2.2. What sets blockchain apart from other electronic certification systems?<\/p>\n

Before blockchain came along, legal practice already had numerous mechanisms for proving the existence, date and integrity of digital documents:<\/p>\n

Qualified trust service providers under the eIDAS Regulation (such as Logalty, eGarante and Signaturit, among others).<\/p>\n

Electronic notarial certifications.<\/p>\n

RFC 3161 timestamps issued by recognised authorities.<\/p>\n

Certified email, digital acknowledgements of receipt or certified delivery platforms.<\/p>\n

The most notable difference between these systems and blockchain is that the former rely on a trusted third party, whereas blockchain runs on a decentralised system in which, in theory, no single entity can tamper with the record. This has led many to regard blockchain as offering a superior form of immutability, traceability and resistance to fraud. But decentralisation alone does not guarantee the evidential reliability or legal validity of the data, especially if:<\/p>\n

The blockchain cannot be audited or verified, or its code is not open.<\/p>\n

The process of inserting the hash is not linked to a qualified electronic identity.<\/p>\n

There is no chain of custody between the author and the recorded content.<\/p>\n

2.3. The eIDAS 2 Regulation and the status of electronic ledgers<\/p>\n

Regulation (EU) 2024\/1183, known as eIDAS 2, now at an advanced stage of implementation, introduces for the first time a legal definition of the electronic ledger, expressly including blockchain. It provides that:<\/p>\n

\u2018An electronic ledger shall not be denied legal effect or admissibility as evidence in judicial or administrative proceedings solely on the grounds that it is in electronic form or that it does not meet the requirements to be considered qualified.\u2019<\/p>\n

However, only electronic ledgers managed by qualified providers will enjoy the presumption of integrity, accuracy and chronological ordering under Article 45g of the draft text.<\/p>\n

Under eIDAS 2, therefore:<\/p>\n

Any electronic ledger is admissible as evidence, but<\/p>\n

Only qualified ledgers enjoy a reinforced, rebuttable (iuris tantum) presumption of accuracy.<\/p>\n

This point is essential to understanding why the Marseille judgment represents a doctrinal rupture: the court gives substantive effect to a blockchain hash without requiring the ledger to be qualified, the author to be identified by qualified means or any direct legal link to the content.<\/p>\n

3. Critical analysis of the judgment: between evidential innovation and the risk of unravelling the legal order<\/p>\n

The judgment of the Tribunal Judiciaire de Marseille is undoubtedly an unprecedented step in recognising blockchain as evidence in the field of intellectual property. But what is truly novel \u2013 and legally troubling \u2013 is not that a hash recorded on a blockchain was accepted as valid evidence, but that this evidence was deemed sufficient to attribute ownership of a copyright without any official registration, contract, witness testimony or other evidence whatsoever.<\/p>\n

3.1. From proof of fact to attribution of rights: a qualitative leap<\/p>\n

Traditionally, the value of evidence in copyright matters has been understood in procedural terms: the point is to show that a piece of content existed on a given date and under certain conditions. In this case, however, the court went a step further, finding that the technological evidence was enough to declare, as a matter of law, who holds the right in the disputed design.<\/p>\n

This is a qualitative leap that is not without risk, because it turns a technical evidential tool into a direct source of legal entitlement, without institutional backing or cross-checking against other safeguards.<\/p>\n

3.2. The absence of registration as a breaking point<\/p>\n

In most legal systems, registration in official registers is not constitutive of copyright, but it does serve as a guarantee of publicity, traceability and enforceability against third parties. So while ownership arises upon creation, the strongest and most universally recognised evidence remains registration in national or international intellectual property registers.<\/p>\n

The decision in question breaks with this systemic logic by declaring ownership on the basis of private, unregulated technological evidence, opening the door to scenarios of legal uncertainty:<\/p>\n

What would happen if someone else produced a different but earlier hash on another blockchain?<\/p>\n

What legitimacy does a chain have if it cannot be audited and offers neither institutional verification nor any guarantee of identity?<\/p>\n

And what if the file linked to the hash was itself plagiarised, so that the hash merely proves possession, not authorship?<\/p>\n

By overlooking these questions, the court shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, in practice reversing the presumption of innocence in the civil sphere.<\/p>\n

3.3. A presumption of legitimacy without institutional oversight<\/p>\n

One of the most controversial aspects of the judgment is its implicit acceptance of a presumption of legitimacy arising from the mere existence of the hash on a blockchain. The court appears to take the view that, absent evidence to the contrary, this technical evidence is enough to attribute the right. That means giving attributive \u2013 not merely circumstantial \u2013 value to a tool that, by its very nature, neither verifies identities nor checks legal intent.<\/p>\n

From a comparative perspective, this position departs from the cautious approach of other jurisdictions, which accept blockchain as a means of proving facts but not as the sole basis for attributing rights. In systems such as those of Germany, Spain and Canada, the general rule remains that proof of authorship requires a body of converging evidence, within which blockchain may play an important \u2013 but never exclusive \u2013 role.<\/p>\n

3.4. A risky precedent in an age of legal hyper-technologisation<\/p>\n

The main risk of this judgment lies not in the use of blockchain but in the principle it enshrines: that a private technology, with no audit or official qualification, can take over the traditional role of registration law or of structured judicial evidence.<\/p>\n

This sets a precedent that could be misread or exploited by businesses, technology platforms or individuals who, with access to blockchain tools, could present themselves as rightholders with nothing more to back them than a unilaterally generated hash.<\/p>\n

4. The principle of legal certainty and its fragility in the face of technological disintermediation<\/p>\n

By giving attributive effect to evidence based exclusively on blockchain, without prior registration or institutional verification, the French judgment raises a fundamental question that goes beyond evidence: can legal certainty be maintained if the system for attributing rights fragments into multiple private technologies, unaudited and free of public oversight?<\/p>\n

The principle of legal certainty, enshrined in most modern constitutional texts (Article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution, Article 1 of the French Civil Code, Article 1.1 of the Italian Constitution, among others), requires legal rules and procedures to be predictable, stable and accessible, so that citizens and businesses can foresee the legal consequences of their actions.<\/p>\n

This principle is not confined to formally guaranteeing legality; it performs a structural function, balancing individual freedom, legitimate expectations and the legal order. In this respect, registration law \u2013 in both its public and its procedural dimensions \u2013 has historically been one of the pillars of that stability, offering:<\/p>\n

Publicity vis-\u00e0-vis third parties.<\/p>\n

A presumption of legitimacy in favour of the registered holder.<\/p>\n

Legal traceability of rights.<\/p>\n

And, in many cases, international coordination through treaties and interoperable registers.<\/p>\n

Replacing this model with private records \u2013 such as public or semi-private blockchains \u2013 managed outside any institutional system brings about a technological disintermediation of the law which, if left unregulated, weakens its very constitutional foundations. Although driven by innovation, this fragmentation risks producing:<\/p>\n

Multiple evidential truths, with no clear hierarchy between them.<\/p>\n

Ownership disputes that cannot be resolved ex ante, only through litigation.<\/p>\n

Uncertain enforceability against third parties, especially in cross-border relationships or in environments without qualified digital identity.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the principle of equal access to effective judicial protection (Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution, Article 6 ECHR) could also be infringed if the legal validity of evidence depends on the financial or technical means to access a particular blockchain solution, depriving others of equivalent but more accessible tools.<\/p>\n

In this context, it cannot be ignored that the law has a protective function which cannot be delegated to technological systems, however efficient they may seem. Replacing legal procedures, public registers or official certifications with decentralised technologies cannot be justified on grounds of efficiency or speed if doing so undermines the shared framework of legal protection.<\/p>\n

What is at stake is not merely the value of a piece of evidence in a particular case, but the regulatory model on which the protection of rights in the digital age is built.<\/p>\n

5. Proposal for an integrated framework: reconciling evidential technology with institutional safeguards<\/p>\n

If technological progress poses challenges for the law, the answer is not to ignore innovation but to integrate it into a regulatory framework that preserves the structural principles of the legal system. Recognising blockchain as a means of evidence \u2013 and even as a tool for attributing rights in some contexts \u2013 need not erode legal certainty, provided that clear regulatory criteria, institutional interoperability and verifiable control mechanisms are put in place.<\/p>\n

5.1. Blockchain as a complementary tool, not a substitute<\/p>\n

The first step is to redefine the role of blockchain in the evidential ecosystem: not as a substitute for official registers, nor as free-standing, self-sufficient proof of ownership, but as an additional item of technical evidence, useful for reinforcing existing evidence or securing its preservation ahead of future disputes.<\/p>\n

In other words, blockchain should be understood as a means of reinforcing documentary evidence, not as an original source of rights or an exclusive presumption of authorship.<\/p>\n

5.2. Qualified providers and audited registers: towards a European legal standard<\/p>\n

The entry into force of the eIDAS 2 Regulation offers a strategic opportunity to establish a common standard for the legal use of distributed technologies. Specifically, the following could be promoted:<\/p>\n

The creation of blockchains audited and certified by qualified trust service providers, subject to verification and interoperability within the European market.<\/p>\n

The integration of qualified digital identity systems (eIDAS) that make it possible to link the hash to an officially recognised natural or legal person.<\/p>\n

The recording of these acts in public or mixed meta-registers, with traceability and institutional integration.<\/p>\n

This approach would make it possible to guarantee the reliability of evidence without sacrificing the technological efficiency or automated traceability of distributed systems.<\/p>\n

5.3. Interconnecting blockchain and official registers<\/p>\n

A realistic legal route, and a technologically feasible one, is to interconnect blockchain with public registers, so that:<\/p>\n

Blockchain entries can carry reinforced evidential weight if they are validated by the registration system.<\/p>\n

Public registers accept blockchain-generated evidence as valid circumstantial evidence, provided it meets certain technical, identity and integrity requirements.<\/p>\n

An evidential chain of custody recognised by the judicial system is established, making it possible to prove the authenticity of the content and its link to the rightholder.<\/p>\n

This formula would harness the efficiency of the technology without giving up the legal safeguards inherent in registration law, creating a secure hybrid ecosystem.<\/p>\n

5.4. A new framework for the digital evidence ecosystem<\/p>\n

The solution is not to choose between the traditional model and technology, but to build an intermediate model of evidential governance based on:<\/p>\n

Common rules on the interoperability of digital evidence.<\/p>\n

Technological and institutional auditing.<\/p>\n

Mutual recognition of verified digital evidence, at least at European level.<\/p>\n

Such a framework would make it possible to meet the challenge posed by the Marseille judgment without falling into technological maximalism or legal anachronism, and would turn blockchain\u2019s disruptive potential into an opportunity to strengthen the digital rule of law.<\/p>\n

6. Concluding remarks<\/p>\n

The March 2025 judgment of the Tribunal Judiciaire de Marseille is a watershed in the legal use of blockchain as evidence in intellectual property matters. Its pioneering nature lies not only in recognising the chronological value of a hash, but in its decision to attribute ownership of a right directly and solely on the basis of that technological evidence, without prior registration or institutional verification.<\/p>\n

Innovative as it is, this precedent calls into question the fundamental pillars of legal certainty by shifting evidential value away from the institutional system towards unregulated, unaudited technological solutions. Attributing rights on the basis of private records, with no public oversight mechanisms or verifiable legal traceability, opens up a scenario of regulatory fragmentation and structural uncertainty that the law cannot ignore.<\/p>\n

Blockchain technology offers real advantages: immutability, traceability and efficiency. But its potential must be channelled through the law, not elevated to an autonomous source of legitimacy. Today\u2019s challenge is not technological but regulatory: how to incorporate these tools into an evidential ecosystem that safeguards rights, is interoperable and is subject to the principle of legality.<\/p>\n

Faced with the temptation to replace traditional systems with decentralised solutions, the legal response must be one of integration. Technological innovation must not weaken the institutional architecture of the rule of law, nor displace the registration system as an instrument of publicity, protection and legal certainty.<\/p>\n

It is therefore essential to move towards a hybrid model in which blockchain can play a complementary role within a regulated framework, linked to qualified providers, with digital identity certification and institutional verification. Only then can we ensure that the technological revolution does not erode the structural principles of the legal order, but instead reinforces them and carries them forward into a fair, secure and coherent digital future.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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